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Abstract 
 
The disruption global digitally based firms are imposing on the positions of established 
multinational telcos is not just in degree, but also in kind. As such, the telcos are entering a 
period of VUCA. Although digitally based competitors could suffer from liabilities of 
‘outsidership’, employing the telco Telenor as a case, we argue that the physical presence of 
telcos in local markets will be insufficient to avoid a future as utilities or dumb-pipes. One 
significant issue as they confront VUCA is therefore whether telcos are able to develop and 
apply dynamic capabilities.   
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VUCA and the Future of the Global Mobile Telco Industry 
 
 
Introduction 
The disruption stemming from digitalization is increasing the environmental volatility, 
uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA) for most international firms, challenging the 
traditional geographic dispersion of their activities and diluting the benefits of building 
physical presence. These VUCA conditions (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014; Schoemaker et al., 
2018) are particularly striking in the case of the global mobile telco industry whose traditional 
competitive advantage has been related to the big investments in physical presence.  Since the 
early 1990s, multinational telcos have been dominant players across many geographies 
typically earning average gross margins of 40 percent (Factset, 2019). Since 2016, the 
consensus within the telco industry is that relative stability is ending as global digitally based 
firms – some known and many unknown – increasingly challenge the position of established 
multinational telcos not just in degree, but also in kind. In April 2016 the CEO of Telenor, a 
leading multinational telco, Sigve Brekke responded to the looming VUCA situation:  
 
“We are faced with the need to change rapidly. We will see a dramatic reduction in 
income from voice. We (therefore) need to embark on a journey from being a 
traditional mobile operator… (and) put into place completely different business 
models to those we have today..” (Dagens Næringsliv, 2016: authors’ translation).  
 
However, as long as local market operating licenses and management of a large 
number of cellular radio towers remain prerequisites for their operations, the business model 
innovation of telcos, unlike digitally based firms, must incorporate local physical presence. 
 
 
 3 
Further, the need to maintain income streams means that telcos cannot simply abandon their 
current business model.  Instead, telcos need to develop ambidexterity (He & Wong, 2004; 
Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008) so that they are both aligned and efficient with current business 
demands while simultaneously being able to develop new capabilities in response to imminent 
VUCA. 
In this paper, we investigate the future of telcos as they contend with VUCA. We 
present the multinational vertically integrated telco model and the VUCA environment it is 
now facing. We contrast the characteristics of telcos with those of digitally based firms 
including their distinctive internationalization process. We discuss the potential value of 
physical presence in national markets and the prospect that digital competitors could suffer 
from liabilities of ‘outsidership’ (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Brouthers et al., 2016). However, 
using various sources of industry data, we explore whether in the long-term, the benefits of 
‘insidership’ in national markets multinational telcos can draw on, will be sufficient to 
maintain their competitive advantage. We argue that these new volatile, uncertain, complex 
and ambiguous pressures demand that multinational telcos develop dynamic capabilities 
(Teece et al., 1997; Schoemaker et al., 2018) that either enable them to compete directly with 
digitally based firms, or to move into novel domains where physical presence is required. 
Failing that, eventually telcos face becoming utilities supplying only price sensitive internet 
connectivity and barely profitable voice and SMS services. 
 
The value of physical presence for established multinational telcos 
Since the early 1990s across many countries, the main players in the mobile telephony 
industry have been multinational telcos such as Vodafone, Telefonica and Telenor 
(Chepkemoi, 2017). In order to operate in national markets they compete for nationally 
regulated operating licenses. Physical presence has been a prerequisite to operate. For 
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example, it has been necessary for the local negotiation of sites for towers and base-stations in 
country markets and for obtaining local marketing expertise. New generations of wireless 
mobile telecommunications technology have been released roughly every 10 years. 1G 
provided voice-service, 2G was about voice and messaging services, and 3G added the first 
viable internet access useful for e-mail and web-browsing (Hess & Neil, 2006).  4G, 
introduced in 2010, granted mobile broadband that functioned across any internet service 
including high-bandwidth demanding services like video streaming (Agrawal et.al, 2015). 
Thus, telcos have constructed their extant business models on voice, messaging and, more 
recently, internet connectivity platforms.  
Telcos have extracted value of their multinationality by typically employing 
internationalization strategies based on a “replicator” approach (Winter & Szulanksi, 2001), 
i.e. they apply their generic business model in each market they enter. However, at the same 
time there has been a view that responsiveness to local market conditions is crucial. Local 
business units have had considerable latitude to develop local market knowledge and to adapt 
their resources to produce and to deliver mobile services that are responsive to local market 
and regulatory conditions. Thus, the basic telco business model is significantly adapted to the 
local context with each foreign market treated as an independent operation (Elter, Gooderham 
& Ulset, 2014).  
Physical presence has been a critical source of experiential local market knowledge 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1997). Eriksson et al. (1997:354) distinguish three dimensions to the 
local market knowledge that is developed through “durable and repetitive interactions” in 
foreign markets. In addition to general internationalization knowledge on how to organize and 
manage international operations, they identify foreign business knowledge and foreign 
institutional knowledge. Foreign business knowledge is market-specific knowledge of 
customer preferences and relationships with local counterparts. In other words, physical 
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presence can lead to knowledge about how to engage with local customers (exchange), how to 
sense customer needs and the development of local networks. Foreign institutional knowledge 
refers to the potential for developing legitimacy in the local institutional setting including an 
understanding of the functioning of local systems for hiring, contract enforcement, and 
national regulations. This causes us to distinguish four types of local market knowledge or 
“operational” capabilities (Winter, 2003) that telcos derive from physical presence – see Table 
1.  
The first column in Table 1 comprises the four types of operational benefits telcos can 
derive from their local market presence and in the second column in the table, (“Relationships 
– current situation”) we summarize the main forms of relationship that telcos have typically to 
date developed through physical presence.  
 
------ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  --------  
 
Exchange refers to knowing how to recruit local customers by using and developing a 
local network of sales agents including meeting the logistical challenge for the distribution of 
SIM-cards (particularly challenging in emerging economies where cash is the only payment 
medium). Sensing denotes local marketing expertise including building local customer 
knowledge, designing local price plans and establishing local brand recognition through local 
mass marketing in physical media. Networking is knowledge about how to negotiate local 
agreements for the location of the necessary network infrastructure such as towers and base 
stations and how to operate a local mobile network. Finally, Legitimacy connotes the 
knowledge that telcos need in order to secure and maintain operating licenses through 
negotiations with local government authorities.  
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 Thus, as telcos enter a new local market they have to build a range of relationships in 
order to thrive and to be able to renew their operating licenses.  To take Legitimacy; the 
perception by government licensing authorities that a telco is a legitimate investor and holder 
of spectrum licenses as well as custodian of sensitive customer data is critical not only for 
entry but for continuing operations.  Legitimacy is also essential for achieving the other 
physical presence benefits. Negotiation of sites for mast building and operating the mobile 
network-infrastructure, pricing and segmentation, customer recruitment, billing relations, and 
customer care all require a sound understanding of local laws and regulations. For example, to 
build masts and towers, knowledge of local contract laws and negotiation practices are 
required in order to contract with local site owners. Networking is also critical for telcos. To 
attract customers and to distribute sim-cards for mobile handsets, telcos typically build and 
serve a local network of sales-agents and logistic capacity across each market. This enables 
Exchange. Sensing is achieved as local marketing staff develop intimate knowledge about 
customer behavior in order to create locally appropriate mass marketing and price plans.  In 
Figure 1, we summarize our four-fold typology of the benefits of physical presence.  
 
------ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  -------- 
 
We emphasize that the benefits or capabilities from physical presence are far from 
abstract. They are tangibly related to developing an interface with local counterparts 
(exchange) for learning about the behavior of local counterparts (sensing), for building trust 
and opportunities with local counterparts (networking) and finally for obtaining local 
legitimacy (legitimacy).  However, while analytically distinct, in day-to-day activities these 
four benefits arising from physical presence are intertwined.  
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Physical presence under increasing VUCA conditions: Challenges for the multinational 
telco business models. 
 
The four benefits associated with physical presence have allowed traditional telcos to deal 
with the VUCA environmental conditions they were facing. For instance, keeping an 
extended network of agents allows to obtain first-hand information from the users, designing 
specific service and pricing plans that accommodate their needs with higher agility (therefore 
addressing volatility and uncertainty). Additionally, building network infrastructure and 
directly negotiating with local authorities help telcos in addressing ambiguity and provides 
legitimacy. Telcos become agents in these institutional environments and know the “rules of 
the game”, which is basic for making judgements about the future. Therefore, so far the 
physical presence has been critical and provided a competitive advantage to telcos. 
However, digital disruption is increasingly questioning the actual value of physical 
presence for established multinationals as research shows how virtual business models 
emerge, where companies establish global platforms for interacting with customers and 
suppliers, changing the logic of multinational competition (Brouthers et al., 2016; Dasí et al., 
2017). 
Regarding the telco industry, even before embedded sim (e-sim) began to emerge as 
an industry change driver – see column 3 in Table 1 – other drivers were modifying aspects of 
the value of physical presence, particularly in regard to Networking. Initially, most telcos 
executed in-house each part of the value chain. From the early 2000s, they started to 
outsource a range of functions. Typically, in each country they outsourced a significant 
portion of the work relating to building and operating their networks. Further, in countries 
with a mature local call center industry, customer care through call-center functions was also 
outsourced. Thus, the telcos became country-by-country “orchestrators” of vendors and 
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selected retained activities. However, this orchestrator role was based on having developed 
considerable local market knowledge.  For example, how to recruit sales agents varies 
between locations, as does contracting with local entrepreneurs in order to build and maintain 
the physical mobile-networks. Without deep local market knowledge, orchestration would be 
highly problematic. 
3G and particularly 4G led to a redrawing of the telco industry boundaries (Patterson 
et.al., 2017; GSMA, 2017). 4G provides internet connectivity as an omnipresent infrastructure 
platform for digital distribution and the use of digital services. With no physical presence, 
digitally based firms were able to use this internet connectivity as an infrastructure for 
launching global digital services. Currently, it is estimated that more than 4 billion people are 
users of the internet (Kemp, 2018). The telco industry body, GSMA (2018), estimates that 4G 
alone accounts for around three quarters of internet use. Some of the digital services, 
including Skype, WhatsApps and Facebook Messenger disrupted the voice and messaging 
income streams of the telcos with estimated lost revenue of $386 billion (Heinrich, 2014). 
However, this posed no VUCA-style threat to telcos. Telcos kept the physical link to 
customers, therefore they could still benefit from exchange and sensing. In this regard, telcos 
coped with volatility and uncertainty by gathering information from customers in a more agile 
way. Value simply migrated from voice and messaging to connectivity. In response, the core 
of the telco business model almost seamlessly shifted from voice and messaging services as 
primary sources of revenue to connectivity (Accenture, 2015). As a result, the total mobile 
revenues have according to GSMA (2018) continued to increase and by 2017 had reached 
$1.05tn. Data thus became the fastest-growing source of revenue for telcos (Dickgreber et al., 
2014). Physical presence including national operating licenses underpinned these new sources 
of revenue.  
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With the imminent launch of e-sim, the nature of the interdependence between telcos 
and digitally based firms is set to change radically (De Wit & Baena, 2017). This will 
introduce more ambiguity and complexity linked to the technological and marketing 
knowledge needed for offering potential new applications. On top of this, telcos will have an 
added difficulty as they will lose the traditional mechanisms for addressing volatility and 
uncertainty, the physical connection to end-users. The introduction of e-sim in all mobile 
handsets means that the last industry proprietary piece of hardware that links telcos to 
customers is gone (Acker et.al., 2016). With e-sim, the operating system or any software on a 
mobile handset can automatically switch between suppliers of mobile broadband based on 
defined algorithms in the software. Therefore, the telcos’ local retail distribution network of 
sales agents and their logistic capacity to physically distribute sim-cards and receive cash-
payments becomes redundant. Subscriptions to mobile services can be fully digitized and 
services can be provided “over the air”. In effect, e-sim will obliterate the current local agent 
distribution network of telcos.  Further, global digitally based firms, with their software 
engineering capabilities, are well positioned to take over the interaction with end-users 
through digital channels.  
Thus, e-sim constitutes a VUCA watershed for established telcos. Unless telcos can do 
as Sigve Brekke outlined and put into place completely different business models, telcos will 
become utilities supplying connectivity that will be subject to increasingly intense price 
competition. Consumers will be beneficiaries but so also will be the global providers of digital 
services that rely on connectivity.  We now investigate the business model of digitally based 
firms, their pattern of internationalization and why their lower physical presence in foreign 
mrakets is challenging established telcos.  
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Digitally-based firms under increasing VUCA 
As Katz & Shapiro (1994) noted, while many products have little value in isolation 
they might be indispensable parts of systems of complementary products. This is indeed the 
case for digital products, which have no value unless they are combined with hardware, other 
software and internet access. Indeed, many digital products have emerged out of previously 
integrated hardware and software solutions such as cloud based collaborative text processing.  
Thus, digital products are not stand-alone products, but organized around technological 
ecosystems or platforms. Some platforms are two-sided markets with network externalities 
i.e. where changes in participation on one side of the market affect the other side of the 
market (Ye, Priem & Alshwer, 2012). The typical structure of these platform markets is that 
there is one or a few leading platforms, several content providers and even more users.  
 Digitally based firms usually follow an aggressive “get-big-fast” strategy striving to: 
1) rapidly grow their platform’s user-base; 2) lock in their users; and 3) prevent rival 
platforms from doing the same (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013). Thus, for digitally based firms 
that seek to become leaders (whether home or abroad) the basic challenge relates to scale (that 
is, getting big enough fast enough). The importance of gaining a large user-base fast is 
reflected in the business models of many platforms like Spotify or Skype, where firms often 
offer a basic free version and an advanced paid version of their product simultaneously. The 
rationale is that the actual value of the product will increase with user adaptation and user 
experience. Largely because of network effects, there is a “winner-takes-all” outcome in 
platform competition on services.  
 Among others, Kim, Nam & Stimpert (2004) highlight that digitally based firms are 
able to overcome physical boundaries and distance. This enables them to efficiently serve 
substantial customer bases. In addition, digitally based firms are able to obtain more detailed 
and higher quality information on local transactions as vast amounts of rich data can be 
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collected and analyzed through the digital interface. These rich data allow for more effective 
marketing methods and to refinements to the product mix, so they can precisely target their 
product or service offerings to specific customers (Kim et al, 2004).   
In a comparative study, UNCTAD (2017) concludes that digitally based firms have a 
fundamentally different footprint to that of traditional firms. They have a very light foreign 
asset footprint, with a ratio between the share of foreign sales and foreign assets of 2.6, while 
typically the ratio for other firms is about 1.0. For telcos it is 0.9. This implies that digitally 
based firms generate more sales abroad while allocating fewer assets abroad than other firms 
including telcos. In fact, allocation of the same amount of foreign assets abroad generates 2.6 
times more foreign sales for digitally based firms than for traditional firms. Thus, 
digitalization appears to break the operational nexus between foreign sales and foreign assets. 
In addition, while there is a significant correlation between foreign assets and foreign sales for 
traditional firms indicating that physical presence is a condition for foreign sales, this 
correlation is insignificant for digitally based firms meaning that physical presence does not 
have the same importance for the generation of foreign sales (UNCTAD, 2017).  This does 
not imply that digitally based firms have no operations abroad. Companies like Airbnb, 
Google and Microsoft, all have employees abroad, but proportionally substantially fewer than 
the telcos.  
 
The Potential Value of Physical Presence 
 Not all observers of digitally based firms are convinced that their business model 
increases the VUCA conditions. At least some of this skepticism can be traced to 
developments in the Uppsala model of internationalization that emerged from observing how 
Swedish manufacturing firms developed into multinational enterprises (MNEs). The original 
model assumes some enduring, transferable, technological superiority on the part of the firm, 
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but argues that internationalization is constrained by a lack of foreign market knowledge. In 
their seminal 1977 article, Johanson and Vahlne stress that in order to move beyond export, 
foreign market knowledge is essential. However, this form of knowledge is “experiential” and 
can only be acquired by operating in the foreign market. Eriksson et al. (1997: 343) stress 
that, “The experience-seeking firm must engage in foreign operations. This implies a presence 
abroad, exposure to the situation abroad, and interaction with specific customers, 
intermediaries and other firms in the international market.” As we outlined above, the core of 
their argument is that physical presence, commitment, and relationship building are 
interlinked and reinforce processes that promote the generation of experiential knowledge of 
the foreign market that give rise to operational capabilities. 
In the course of four decades, the Uppsala model has evolved in several ways.  Current 
versions have a less deterministic approach to the mode of entry choice and, with the 
introduction of dynamic capabilities, a more entrepreneurial perspective on the heterogeneity 
of a firm’s resources (Vahlne & Johanson, 2017). Further, the original notion of market 
commitment through physical presence as an absolute prerequisite for knowledge acquisition 
and success has been modified. Nevertheless, the model still underscores the benefits deriving 
from physical presence:  
“Commitments describes the distribution of resources over the MNE’s functions, its 
product lines, the countries where it is active, and the relationships where it has 
invested. The term also has a forward-looking connotation: positions reflect 
commitments to particular courses of action” (Vahlne & Johanson, 2017:  1097). 
Another development to the Uppsala model of internationalization is contained in 
Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009) revisited version of their model. They argue that rather than 
conceiving the knowledge constraint as exclusively deriving from psychic distance, and 
therefore grounded in a liability of foreignness, outsidership in relation to relevant networks is 
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increasingly the main source of uncertainty. Insidership in networks of business relationships 
provides a firm with an extended knowledge base thereby enabling it to identify opportunities 
and to overcome the liability of outsidership.  
Brouthers et al. (2016) recognize that the internationalization process of digitally based 
firms differs from traditional firms in that at relatively little cost they can immediately 
replicate and transfer their business models and electronic platforms across markets. 
However, while Brouthers et al. (2016) argue that, when compared to traditional firms, 
digitally based firms suffer to a lesser extent from investment risks related to liabilities of 
foreignness when they internationalize, they suggest that: 
“(these) firms have to deal with greater liabilities of outsidership since their main 
concern is the creation of a large enough network of users to generate value on (their) 
platforms…The lack of network connections means that the firm may suffer from greater 
unfamiliarity with the location, (and) may lack legitimacy because the firm does not 
understand how to adapt its products/services, and tend to suffer increased relational 
hazards, since the lack of connections means it is hard to determine which local firms to 
team up with and which to avoid” (Brothers et al. 2016:514/517).  
 
In terms of Figure 1, Brouthers et al. (2016) are highlighting in particular the significance of 
networking and legitimacy issues. We observe a number of examples of digitally based firms 
that have failed or struggled to enter foreign markets or maintain their positions in foreign 
markets precisely because of these issues. For example, Airbnb has labored in China. In a 
blog post its CEO, Brian Chesky, wrote, “as we move into our next phase of expansion in 
China, we know we will need deep local knowledge and expertise to keep this momentum 
going.” (Financial Times, 2015). The impact of differences in national regulatory regimes has 
been a particular issue for Uber. Failure to achieve local legitimacy has resulted in Uber being 
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proscribed in several countries. Since December 2015, Google has been subject to regulatory 
expectations in the EU and is monitored by the EU’s data protection authorities.  The 
legitimacy of Facebook’s mode of operation has also been questioned. Subsequently, in 
Europe, the EU in May 2018 introduced data protection rules that guard against the misuse of 
collected data. However, networking is also surfacing as an issue. For example, a number of 
EU member states apply quotas to the streaming service Netflix for European productions. 
French rules stipulate that 40 percent of broadcast programming must be original French 
language material (Barbière, 2016).  
Figure 2 summarizes how the four benefits of physical presence are affected by operating 
as a digitally based firm. 
   
------ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE  -------- 
 
 To take exchange and sensing first, digitally based firms are limited to reaching 
customers. They cannot interact directly with or sense their needs. However, they can 
compensate for this by for example offering free (basic) versions of their products, so that 
customers can easily access and test them and leave on-line feedback.  To some extent 
accumulating rich data on customer behavior could substitute for direct local exchange with 
customers.  Networking and obtaining local legitimacy are distinctly harder to accomplish 
remotely.  Indeed, our argument is that many of the problems that digitally based firms are 
experiencing are precisely related to a lack of networking and legitimacy. Further, while it 
may be the case that a global brand may provide some legitimacy, it also potentially creates 
more vulnerability as a loss of legitimacy in one location might have global implications. 
Based on our four-fold typology that we introduced in Figure 1, Figure 2 proposes that 
digitally based firms are able to go international with an asset light model (as they can reap 
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the benefits of exchange and sensing remotely). However, their lack of foreign physical 
presence could mean that they fail to network sufficiently with local actors and do not succeed 
in achieving necessary legitimacy in foreign markets.  Thus, they are lacking in critical 
operational capabilities. In the following, we will critically explore this liability of 
outsidership perspective on the telco industry. We aim to tease out how physical presence (or 
lack of it) is playing out in the industry in terms of telcos versus digitally based firms.   
 
Methodology and data  
In the next sections, we move into the explorative part of our paper. The main issue we 
investigate is whether local market physical presence will continue to constitute a durable 
competitive advantage for telcos as they enter VUCA or whether this must be supplemented 
with dynamic capabilities. Given the process nature of this analysis, we draw on various 
sources of qualitative data (Bansal et al., 2018). Our data for digitally based firms and the 
telco industry comprises published perceptions from industry analysts. Generally, we found a 
substantial commonality in their views. Further, one of the four authors is employed by 
Telenor in its strategy department and he has had access to company internal strategy 
documents. In particular, the future perceptions contained in the third and fourth columns in 
Table 1, “Change-drivers” and “Implications” are derived from a series of conversations 
conducted within Telenor during 2018.    
 
THE TELCO INDUSTRY: CHANGE DRIVERS AND IMPLICATIONS  
The telcos’ original core offerings, voice and messaging have already been disrupted 
as a future revenue source by new digital services such as Skype and Facebook Messenger 
that offer these services over the internet with more features than offered by the telcos. 
However, in mature markets, mobile operators have to date been able to successfully move 
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their value capture from voice, messaging and internet connectivity as separate revenue 
streams to internet connectivity with voice and messaging bundled for “free” as part of their 
internet connectivity services. In that sense, the telcos’ historic investments in physical 
presence have proved durable. The question is whether this resilience will endure the 
emerging context of digital services and platforms that enable direct and immediate 
interactions between users and producers located in entirely different parts of the world. Is it 
the case that telcos can address specifically local customer needs in ways that digitally based 
firms with their universalistic approach are unable to address? We take each element in 
column 3 (“Change-drivers”) and column 4 (Implications) of Table 1 in turn. We structure our 
discussion in accordance with column 1, i.e. the four benefits of physical presence we identify 
in Figure 1. We view exchange and sensing as foreignness challenges and networking and 
legitimacy ones of outsidership.   
     
Exchange   
Exchange refers to the operational capability that derives from knowledge of how to 
recruit local customers by using and developing a local network of sales agents including 
meeting the logistical challenge for the distribution of SIM-card. One key factor at the core of 
the local business models of incumbent telcos is that customers have needed a physical sim-
card installed in their handset to be able to use mobile services.This has necessitated networks 
of local sales agents and distribution. In emerging markets there is an additional factor. These 
are cash-only economies with 2 billion unbanked people (Asktrakhan, 2016), which 
necessitates physical money exchange for a service. Both of these two factors require local 
presence and market knowledge. However, both the sim-card and cash-payment are about to 
be digitized causing the local agent-network to become superfluous. 
 
 
 
 17 
Sensing 
Sensing denotes the development of local marketing expertise including building local 
customer knowledge, designing local price plans and establishing local brand recognition 
through local mass marketing in physical media. For incumbent telcos the ability to recruit 
and retain customers has required intimate local customer knowledge in order to carry out 
targeted marketing campaigns and for the tailoring of price-plans for mobile services. This 
approach is already declining in favor of using online and personalized digital marketing 
(Constantinides, 2014; Gallegos, 2016; Wixcey, 2015) which requires large datasets and 
advanced computer based analytics suited for multi-country marketing where national 
regulations permits (Gordon & Spillecke, 2013). With the introduction of e-sim, the 
knowledge of the telcos local marketing experts is set to be further devalued with the 
introduction of computer-based analytics and machine learning as a means to segmenting 
customers and to personalizing marketing. Digitally based firms such as Google and 
Facebook see no role for local marketing experts (Court et.al., 2015).  
 
Networking 
A networking capability derives from knowledge of how to negotiate local agreements 
for the location of the necessary network infrastructure such as towers and base stations. We 
observe three developments to networking. First, originally, incumbent telcos established, 
owned and operated towers and base stations and negotiated with site owners. By owning the 
towers and base-stations mobile operators have been able to control the network infrastructure 
to differentiate on network coverage and capacity. However, over the last 20 years, a new 
breed of independent telecom tower companies has created a USD 300 billion infrastructure 
asset class, the tower industry, which now owns 68.7 per cent of the world’s investable towers 
and rooftops (Osmotherly, 2018). Further, this industry is now rapidly evolving the 
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competencies that it shared with the telcos so as to incorporate services such as energy, small 
cells and backhaul (Wei & Neri, 2015).  
A second development regards the knowledge of how to operate a local mobile 
network. Telco vendors such as Ericsson, Huawei and Nokia-Siemens have increasingly 
provided telcos with country-by-country vertically integrated mobile-network technology 
solutions. As such this type of local market knowledge no longer resides primarily within the 
telcos. Further, with the transition to 5G, the physical hardware layer of networks will be 
separated from the service layer and future services will be developed by software only. With 
the introduction of 5G, where national regulations permit, the need incumbent telcos have had 
for local market knowledge and resources could be replaced by multi-country solutions 
similar to those employed by the internet industry in their operation of multi-country cloud 
data-centers (e.g. Microsoft operates its data-centers for cloud-services to the European 
market from Amsterdam and Dublin).   
A third development relates to knowledge of how to network with local providers of 
digital services. Assuming increasing government pressure to protect local services and 
content providers, this particular local networking capability could be advantageous for 
identifying and forming partnerships with local companies. Thus, in this regard, the physical 
presence telcos have invested in could continue to be of value.   
 
Legitimacy 
The telco industry is regulated by country governments who also license spectrum. 
Legitimacy stems from learning how to negotiate with local telco licensing authorities in 
order to acquire and maintain spectrum. Local legitimacy will continue to be important for the 
holding of spectrum licenses. In the sense of being able to regularly interact with government 
regulators, physical presence will continue to be advantageous. 
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Overall our analysis indicates that significant parts of the operational capabilities of 
telcos deriving from local market knowledge are set to lose value. This is particularly so in 
relation to exchange and sensing. However, physical presence that grants local insidership 
will continue to be of value for local networking and for legitimacy. Liabilities due to a lack 
of insidership are, according to Brouthers et al. (2016), the main challenge that digitally based 
firms face. The core of their business services is to provide a platform that allows users to buy 
and sell products/services to each other or exchange information with each other (Brouthers 
et.al., 2016). As noted above, Brouthers et al. (2016) point to their lack of embeddedness in 
local markets.  Even if digitally based firms such as Google and Facebook deploy cloud based 
technology platforms that are globally accessible, they cannot do away with the need for 
experiential business knowledge for each country they enter. Users and companies must be 
recruited to their platforms.  However, digitally based firms lack direct ties to potential 
platform users in foreign markets. At the extreme, a digitally based firm will have no users 
when it enters a new market and potential users will be reluctant to adopt its platform.  
However, while we emphasize outsidership as the liability faced by digitally based 
firms, there will also be issues of foreignness. One reason for this is due to the very variable 
penetration rates of smart-phones and internet in many emerging economies. Therefore, there 
is a dependence on local institutions and investments in local infrastructure. For instance, 
according to Open Signal records for 2017, while 97.45 per cent of time users have 4G access 
in South Korea with high speed, countries like Brazil have a lower coverage of 3G or more 
(75.2 percent) and at low speed.  In Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar the current penetration of 
smartphones is approximately 35 percent. Low penetration of smartphones and internet 
creates two problems for the digitally based firms. First, their services presume a stable, fast 
and reliable internet infrastructure across the country in order to penetrate. Thus, considerable 
further market uptake of internet and smartphones is a necessity for digitally based firms’ 
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growth. Lacking physical presence, their one-size approach will likely encounter difficulties 
when dealing with diversity in infrastructure and the multiplicity of institutional environments 
this generates (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Telcos with subsidiaries operating in each 
environment will invariably have a superior local understanding of the state and evolution of 
the needed infrastructures. Additionally, having a local presence increases their legitimacy to 
initiate and follow negotiations related to the infrastructure investments. Compared to new 
digital players, incumbents that grant compliance with institutional requirements might enjoy 
from higher legitimacy.  
This view of physical presence and the potential advantage it confers on telcos as they 
enter VUCA is shared by industry consultants. Senior partner at McKinsey, Miklos Dietz 
(Schwartz, 2017) argues that:  
“Large incumbent businesses have plenty of competitive advantages from trust, brand, 
data, and capital to be able to shape the emerging future of ecosystems. They can 
become crucial partners. It really depends on whether they are fast enough reinventing 
their business models and realizing that they are not just playing in their little industry 
anymore, but in a very different and much broader universe.”  
 
To date, we can indeed perceive a number of examples of close collaboration between 
digitally based firms such as Google and Facebook and incumbent telcos such as Telenor. For 
instance, Facebook has developed a low-end version of its service that Telenor is offering at 
zero-rate data-traffic to stimulate uptake of internet. When users want to move to the full 
version of Facebook, data-tariffs apply. Telenor and Google have collaborated to create 
direct-operator billing embedded in YouTube. If a user does not have sufficient prepaid data 
to watch a YouTube video over internet, a top-up can be executed online with direct operator 
billing embedded in YouTube. These examples illustrate mutually beneficial partnerships 
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where telcos grow uptake of internet and digitally based firms acquire users of their digital 
services.  The outsidership of the digitally based firms is attenuated by partnering with telcos 
that have local insidership both in terms of operating licenses and marketing knowledge.  
 
Discussion    
There is a tension between the traditional model of internationalization (built around 
physical presence in foreign markets) and a new emergent model of internationalization 
(foreign asset light) that is being played out in many industries. In the light of this tension 
Telco industry observer Venkat Atluri of McKinsey (Schwartz, 2017) summarizes the 
uncertain VUCA future for the telcos. Atluri recognizes that as the telcos approach their 
VUCA they have some advantages that derive from physical presence, but that these will be 
insufficient: He contends that: 
“…the so-called nondigital players have some critical assets (such as) customer 
relationships, (and) things like channel relationships. Those are very, very hard for the 
broader digital players to reestablish or put in place. That is going to help the so-called 
nondigital players quite a bit, to cover their position, and I’m equally as optimistic as 
(to) their potential to take advantage of these sectors-without-borders friends…. 
(However,)….they (will) have to work hard to change their DNA”.  
 
At the outset of the paper, we specified four distinct benefits of physical presence in 
foreign markets: exchange, sensing, networking, and legitimacy. Thereafter, we have explored 
the proposition that digitally-based firms are able to operate internationally with less physical 
presence as they can organize exchange and sensing remotely. Further, we have considered 
whether they face a challenge in relation to developing local networks and local legitimacy.  
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As outlined, the telco industry serves as a context for studying the effect of having or 
not having a physical presence in foreign markets. It includes the incumbent telcos all of 
whom have significant physical presence in the markets in which they operate and digitally 
based firms that operate based on substantially fewer commitments in foreign markets. For 
the telcos it has been a necessity to build substantial physical presence in order to obtain the 
benefits of exchange, sensing, networking and legitimacy. However, as the telco industry 
undergoes change, new digitally based firms such as Facebook and Netflix are entering the 
industry with a less costly, foreign asset light model. In particular, we have focused on the 
value of insidership that derives from physical presence and that creates the basis for trust 
building relationships and legitimacy. 
At the very least mobile telcos will survive as utilities or dumb pipes supplying 
connectivity, the local market knowledge that enables them to acquire operating licenses 
guarantees them this. Some, such as industry analyst, Jamie Davies (2018), already perceives 
a trend toward a dumb-pipe mode whereby “telcos… facilitate the transfer of information 
while the value add services, and the lion’s share of profits, are…absorbed by the internet and 
technology brands at the top of the supply chain.” As, however, Davies acknowledges, “the 
telcos are keen to resist this trend.” Nevertheless, simply relying on local market physical 
presence to enable partnerships with digitally based firms suffering from the liability of 
outsidership is precarious.  Industry analyst Simon Torrance (2018) is not hopeful that the 
telcos are able to respond to the VUCA threat posed by digitally based firms. He views telcos 
as sleep-walking into the future. In his view:  
“Telcos still have most of the assets in place that can be leveraged to upgrade their 
business model and create a new way to grow. The problem is that, in practice, they 
have become stuck, like many now-incumbent organizations, in what Jeff Bezos calls 
Day 2 thinking (i.e. stasis, followed by irrelevance, decline and death)…. They are 
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failing at effectively transforming for a digital world, and so they remain stubbornly 
'defensive' stocks for investors, sinking more and more towards utility status and 
unable to attract talent and excite customers in the way they once did.” 
 
 One approach to explaining the ability of firms to reconfigure their resource bases in the 
face of VUCA is that of dynamic capabilities (Schoemaker et al., 2018). Teece (2007) breaks 
these down into three primary components, “sensing” external opportunities and threats, 
“seizing” opportunities by, not least, designing innovative business models and 
“transforming” both internal and external assets.  “However…, (as Teece readily admits), 
“understanding how to enhance performance of the enterprise through sensing future needs, 
(seizing and transforming) remains enigmatic” (Teece, 2007:1345). One view of why 
dynamic capabilities are so “enigmatic” is that the concept encompasses the reconfiguration 
of both resources and activities; some of these are tangible and observable, while others are 
intangible and difficult to observe (Sheehan & Foss, 2017).  
 Our view is that the observable activities of managers are a key component of dynamic 
capabilities (Helfat & Martin, 2015). For telcos to evolve new business models that enables 
them to compete with digitally based firms, or to move into new novel domains, their 
managers will not only sense but also seize new capabilities in for example computer based 
analytics and machine learning in order to transform current local marketing knowledge 
(Meffert & Mohr, 2017). We observe examples of managers of telcos that while maintaining 
their current business models are simultaneously investing in new domains, such as the Finish 
telco Elisa that is developing IoT knowledge to digitize factories (CIO Applications Europe, 
2019). However, on a general level we cannot predict whether the managers of telcos will act 
with sufficient foresight to acquire necessary relevant dynamic capabilities. Indeed, we 
acknowledge that firms located in business environments subject to VUCA often, simply die 
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(Christensen, 1997). Nonetheless, there are established firms that do cope with rapid, 
unpredictable, complex and ambiguous change and that succeed in business model innovation 
in the sense of a complete reconfiguration of how they do business (Zott & Amit, 2017).  
 Finally, just as we cannot predict the ability of incumbent telcos to incorporate and apply 
dynamic capabilities, nor can we predict the future direction of government and inter-
government regulation of digitally based firms. We have referred to recent developments in 
Europe that constrain the activities of digitally based firms. The EU is increasingly “taking on 
the tech giants” and given that “the EU’s standards are often copied in the emerging world” 
(Economist: 2019:11) the value of the insidership that is embedded in the local physical 
presence of telcos could be further enhanced. However, while government regulation of 
digitally based firms can provide telcos some degree of shelter from VUCA, of itself it is 
unlikely to be sufficient to secure any extension to the competitive advantage these firms have 
enjoyed for more than two decades.  
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Figure 1. Benefits of physical presence 
 
   
Figure 2. What changes for digitally based firms 
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Benefits of 
physical 
presence 
Relationships – current 
situation 
 
Change-drivers Implications  
EXCHANGE 
Local customer 
recruitment by 
using/developing local 
agent network and 
logistics for selling SIM-
cards. 
Cash is only payment 
method in emerging 
economies.  
With E-sim, service 
provisioning will be done 
over the air.  
No need for cash-payment 
with introduction of digital 
payment to all customers 
also in emerging markets.  
No future value:  
Local agent-network 
superfluous. 
SENSING 
Local marketing expertise 
including building local 
customer knowledge, 
designing local price plans 
and establishing local 
brand recognition 
through local mass 
marketing in physical 
media.  
 
Use of computer based 
analytics and machine 
learning deployed to 
understand and segment 
customers. Personalized 
price-plans created on 
corporate policies.  Online 
marketing and use of 
analytics to personalize 
marketing campaigns. 
Limited future value 
unless transformed:  
Multi country computer 
based marketing 
supplement and may 
eventually take over the 
job of local marketing 
experts. Remaining local 
marketing require few 
local resources.  
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Table 1: Current local market knowledge and its future value 
 
 
 
 
Local marketing expert 
knowledge of potential 
value if converted to non-
utility services.   
NETWORKING 
Local negotiation of sites 
and building network 
infrastructure of towers 
and base-stations in 
country markets.  
Spin-off to tower-
companies. Tower 
companies expand business 
from managing only towers, 
antennas and power to also 
manage base-stations. 
Integrated operators 
faced with a choice to 
outsource to tower-
companies: 
Outsourcing over the 
years means that 
specialized local market 
knowledge has passed to 
external firms.  
Country operation of 
local mobile-network.  
Transition to 5G involves 
separation of physical 
network infrastructure from 
services by deploying 
software and cloud-
technologies 
Limited need of future 
local resources:  
Mobile operation 
performed in multi-
country cloud data-
centers. Distributed data 
operated remotely. Local 
knowledge and resources 
moved to multi-country 
setup if national 
regulations permits 
LEGITIMACY 
Governmental relations 
and negotiations to invest 
and hold spectrum 
licenses: i.e. local 
legitimacy 
 
No change Continued value 
Local legitimacy 
continues to be 
important  
